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One Terrorist at a Time

By Leon Fuerth
01.04.02

ASHINGTON -- Advocates of going to war to displace Saddam Hussein are working hard to sell their case to the public, and there are indications of a vigorous debate on Iraq within the Bush administration. But eliminating Mr. Hussein's regime will not solve the terrorism problem as exemplified by Al Qaeda ‹ and waging war against Iraq could create new threats.

Saddam Hussein is dangerous and likely to become more so. He may well possess stocks of biological weapons that escaped both the bombardments of the Persian Gulf war and the subsequent investigations by United Nations inspectors. He is trying to rebuild his capacity to make weapons of mass destruction as the United Nations sanctions system ‹ intended to keep military supplies from entering Iraq ‹ grows ever more porous. He has demonstrated more than enough ruthlessness for us to credit him with the will to use weapons of mass destruction. He is a permanent menace to his region and to the vital interests of the United States. He and his government must be ripped out of Iraq if we are ever to be secure and if the sufferings of the Iraqi people are ever to abate.

Nonetheless, Mr. Hussein is not our most serious problem, and attacking him would be at the expense of higher priorities.

		"Arguments that (Saddam's) fall would require little American military investment are reckless in the extreme."

There may well have been interaction between Mr. Hussein's intelligence apparatus and various terrorist networks, including that of Osama bin Laden. But it was Mr. bin Laden's network that brought about the Sept. 11 attacks, and his agents did not come from Iraq. There is no credible public information to indicate that Iraq was significantly involved.

It is, indeed, characteristic of Mr. bin Laden's network that it does not entirely depend on a state sponsor like Iraq. What makes Al Qaeda so dangerous is not Mr. bin Laden ‹ although his death or capture would remove a great, evil talent from the leadership of terrorism ‹ but his development of the concept of using a network as a vehicle for leveraging many individuals and groups, each weak on its own, into an engine of destruction powerful enough to hurt the United States.

The capacity to network, as described by a growing number of scholars, means an ability to create ad hoc patterns of activity among widely distributed cells: to communicate, pass resources, move key personnel and maintain the initiative through audacious planning. It is the network that gives what Mr. bin Laden created the means to adapt even to his demise, taking advantage of an organizational pattern that resembles that of a global multinational corporation.

After the dislocation of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the next phase needs to be a sustained assault on the broader network: attacking its individual cells by working in concert with intelligence and police services around the world. Multilateral cooperation is of the essence, as it was in the Afghanistan campaign. Anything that distracts us from relentless pursuit of the system by which terrorist groups can operate as networked entities ‹ and anything that detracts from the willingness of other governments to work alongside us ‹ is at the expense of our national security.

An immediate attack on Saddam Hussein carries a very high risk of constituting just such a fatal diversion. Arguments that his fall would require little American military investment are reckless in the extreme. Claims that the Iraqi National Congress, or the two main Kurdish groups, are ready to be Iraq's version of the Northern Alliance are misapplied analogies. Assurances that Iraq's neighbors would be happy to see Mr. Hussein eliminated are dangerous simplifications. Claims that we can either hold the coalition together if we promptly attack Saddam Hussein or that we no longer need a coalition are simply guesses.

America's choices are not limited to attack or neglect. There can be an interim program for Iraq. We should reheat the demand for international inspectors and return to the Security Council for "smart" sanctions. We should take the position that if Mr. Hussein blocks inspection of facilities suspected of being used for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, the United States will destroy those sites.

Further, we should develop the capabilities of the Iraqi National Congress, help the Kurds while making clear that we are not supporting a Kurdish state, and use covert action across its full potential. We should also develop homeland defense as an absolute priority, to hedge against the risk that Saddam Hussein ‹ or any other opponent ‹ might try to reach us with a weapon of mass destruction or mass disruption.

Our hand could be forced by convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein was a central actor in the use of anthrax as a weapon against us or by some new move on his part that threatens his neighbors. Absent such developments, the United States should focus on destroying what threatens us most: the ability of terrorist organizations to organize and to attack through a dispersed network; literally, the globalization of terror.

Leon Fuerth, visiting professor of international relations at George Washington University, was national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore.

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